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CIVIL COURT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF BRONX: HOUSING PART F

BPE REAL TY OWNER LLC & BPE II LLC
& BPE BARKER LLC,
L&T Index No. 045677/2019
Petitioner-Landlord,
DECISION/ORDER

-againstMOTION SEQUENCE

1

DIONNA GARRICK,
Respondent-Tenant.
Recitatio11., as required by C.P.L.R. § 22 l 9(a), of the papers considered in review of this motion.
Pupers Numbered

Notice of Motion [With Affirmation & Exhibits A-I] .................................. ...... .
Affirmation in Opposition (With Affidavit, Affirmation & Exhibits A-FJ . . . . . . .

2

Reply Affirmation in Support [With Exhibits A-DJ . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

3

After oral argument held on February 6, 2020, and upon the foregoing cited papers, the
decision and order on this motion is as fol lows:
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

BPE Realty Owner LLC & BPE II LLC & BPE Barker LLC, ("petitioner"), commenced
this summary non-payment proceeding allegiilg Dionna Garrick ("respondent"), owed
$12,900.00 in rental arrears through October 2019. 1 The matter first appeared on calendar on
November 6, 2019 and respondent obtained her attorney through the Universal Access to
Cow.isel program, ("UAC"). The proceeding was adjourned first for tri al or settlement, to
December 5, 2019, and subsequently for trial , to December 20, 2019. Respondent interposed a
motion for leave to serve and file a11 amended answer and for pre-trial discovery returnable on
the trial date. As a result, the proceeding was adjourned to February 6, 2020 for motion practice

and oral argument.

1

See non-payment petition.
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Respondent's counsel, without an affidavit from respondent, argues she should be
allowed to amend her answer as she was not aware of her defenses prior to retaining counsel.
Respondent also argues that there is no prejudice to petitioner, and that she has meritorious
defenses and counterclaims, including improper rent demand due to charging more than the
allowable rent, inability to collect rent increases until proper registrations are filed due to failure
to register the subject premises with the Division of Housing and Community Renewal
("DHCR") from 1984 through 201 1, a rent overcharge, breach of the warranty of habitability,
and attorneys' fees.
Petitioner opposes the motion arguing that the proposed defenses and counterclaims are
without merit and/or prejudicial, that respondent failed to show ample need for discovery and
that the proposed discovery is too broad and not narrowly tailored.

DISCUSSION
Motion to Amend Answer
CPLR 3025(b) provides that leave to amend a pleading shall be freely given upon such
terms as may be just. (Norwood v City ofNew York, 203 AD2d 147, 148-149, 6 10 NYS2d 249
[ 151 Dept 1994]). Amendment can be at any time, especially where there is not significant
prejudice to the opposing party. (National Union Fire Ins. Co. v Schwartz, 209 AD2d 289, 290,
619 NYS2d 542 [1 st Dept 1994]). Further, the proposed amended answer contains meritorious
defenses (Thomas Crimmins Contracting Co. v New York, 74 NY2d 166, 170, 544 NYS2d 580
[1989]), including improper rent demand, inability to collect rent increases, overcharge and
breach of the warranty of habitability. 2
Petitioner argues that the proposed defenses are meritless. While proposed defenses
which "plainly lack merit,, should be denied, (Thomas Crimmins Contracting Co., 74 NY2d at
170), at least some of the proposed amendments are, in fact, potentially meritorious. (see

Goldman v City ofNew York, 287 AD2d 482, 483, 73 l NYS2d 2 12 [211 d Dept 2001]).
The court finds that respondent' s rent-related defenses of improper rent demand seeking
more than the allowable rent, improper petition and inability to collect rent increases due to
missing and/or improper DHCR registrations and rent overcharge all have merit.

2

See Amended Answer attached to motion as Exhibit 1-1.
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Respondent argues that petitioner has been charging her an incorrect rent and charging
her more than the allowable legal regulated rent since she moved into the subject premises in
August 2018 with an initial legal regulated rent of $2,762.69 and a preferential rent of
$2, 150.00. 3 Respondent's claim is based upon the apartment registration histoty with DHCR,
which shows that the legal rent for the subject premises increased by over 67% between the 2018
and 2019 registrations, from $ 1,646.65 to $2,762.69. 4
Respondent's claim is also based upon the fact that the apartment registration history
shows that the subject premises were not registered with DHCR from 1984 through 2011 , a
period of27 years, and was first registered in 2012 with a legal regulated rent of $1,345.6 1. 5 The
court also notes that the 2012 registration was pursuant to a lease renewal, not a vacancy lease,
which would imply that there was at least one prior lease not registered with DHCR.
Petitioner provides no explanation for the failure to register the subject premises from
1984 tlu·ough 2011 and, in fact, concedes in paragraph 52 of its opposition papers that the DHCR
rent registration for the subject premises annexed to respondent's motion is " [a] true copy."
Consequently, there is no dispute that the rent increased by over 67% between the 20 18
and 2019 DHCR registrations.6
The 2019 Housing Stability and Tenant Protection Act, ("2019 HSTPA"), while limiting
rent overcharge damages (including treble damages] to six years, does not provide any temporal
limitations on this court in determining the legal regulated rent or in investigating overcharge
complaints.
Indee.d, Part F § 5 of the 2019 HSTPA amended RSL § 26-5 16 as follows:

"h. The division of housing and community renewal and the courts, in
investigating complaints ofovercharge and in determining legal regulated
rents, shall consider all available rent history which is reasonably necessa1y to
make such determinations, including but not limited to (i) any rent registration or
other records filed with the state division of housing and community renewal, or
any other state, municipal or federal agency, regardless of the date to which the
information on such registration refers; (ii) any order issued by any state,
municipal or federal agency; (iii) any records maintained by the owner or tenants;
3

See Exhibit A to motion and exhibit D to opposition.
See Exhibits F & H to motion. The court notes that although respondent argues that the subject premises were not
registered properly for 20 18-20 19, petitioner attaches a copy of the 2019 registration for the subject premises
showing the proper 1-year lease term from August 15, 2018 through August 14, 20 19 with a legal regulated rent of
$2,762.69 and a preferential rent of $2, 150.00. See Exhibit F to opposition.
s See Exhibits F & H to motion.
6
See exhibits F & H to motion and exhibit F to opposition.
4
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and (iv) any public record kept in U1e regular course of business by any state,
municipal or federal agency. Nothing contained in this paragraph shall limit the
examination ofrent histo1y relevant to a determination as to:
(i) whether the legality of a rental amount charged or registered is reliable
in light of all available evidence including, but not limited to, whether an
unexplained increase in the registered or lease rents, or a fraudulent
scheme to destabilize the housing accommodation, rendered such rent or
registration unreliable;
(iv) whether an overcharge was or was not willful;
(vi) the existence or terms and conditions of a preferential rent, or the
propriety of a legal registered rent during a period when the tenants were
charged a preferential rent;
(vii) the legality of a rent charged or registered immediately prior to the
registration of a preferential rent; or
[emphasis added].
This significant change to the law means that a mere " unexplained" increase in rent, like
the over 67% increase here from $1,646.65 to $2,762.69 in 2018, can give rise to an overcharge
claim.7
The HSTPA also allows an examination into whether the rent registered with DHCR for
the .first time was proper. This is especially true here, where the subject premises were
unregistered for decades so that the initial rent is not inherently reliable, where the initial
registered rent was the only legal rent registered " immediately prior" to the registration of a
preferential rent given to a ll tenants to date, and where the propiiety of the legal rent to date is
called into question by the continuous charging of a preferential rent. 8
Part F, § 7 of the 2019 HSTPA further states, " [t]his act shall take effect immediately and
shall apply to any claims pending or filed on the after such date.)• As such, the act applies to this
case so that respondent's rent related defenses, affirmative defenses and counterclaims, all
sounding in overcharge and improper registration, are potentially m~ritorious.
The breach of the warranty of habitability claim also has merit. While petitioner alleges
that respondent has already preserved this claim in her prose answer, the court sees no reason
1

Compare, Gri111111 v State Div. ofHo11s. & Community Renewal, 15 NY3d 358, 367 (20 I0) ("a mere allegation of
fraud alone, without more, will not be sufficient to require DHCR to inquire further"); Maller ofBoydv New York
State Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal, 23 NY3d 999 [2014) (significant rent increase alone was insufficient
indicia of a fraudulent scheme).
8
See Exhibit F to motion.
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she should not be allowed to amend her claim by including the alleged conditions and providing
supplemental details and factual allegations to a claim that respondent herself has already
asserted.
As to the arguments that respondent does not show proof of notice to petitioner or
reasonable opportunity to cure, that the alleged conditions are violations of record, that petitioner
fai led or refused to make repairs, or that the alleged conditions affect the livability of the subject
premises and are not merely de minimis conditions, these are issues for trial which may provide
petitioner with a defense to respondent' s counterclaim and demand for an abatement, but do not
affect the merit of respondent's claim.

Jn any case, the court notes that respondent need not prove her claim at this time. The
existence of violations, for instance, may be proved by DHPD or inspection reports; DHPD or
other governmental computerized records; photographs; or through testimony. (Scherer and
Fisher, Residential Landlord-Tenant Law in New York § 19:65 [2018 Update]; See Mite v
Pipedreams Realty, 190 Misc. 2d 543, 740 NYS2d 564 [Civ Ct, Bronx County 2002]).
As to respondent's counterclaim for attorneys' fees, the court notes that not only does the
petition seek attorneys' fees costs and disbursements, 9 but petitioner attaches the initial lease
which contains an attorney's fees clause allowing either party to seek legal fees.

10

As such,

respondent's counterclaim for legal fees does not "plainly lack merit." As it is settled law that
only the prevailing party may collect legal fees, (Nestor v McDowell, 81 NY2d 410, 415, 599
NYS2d 507 [1993]), respondent' s counterclaim is simply a reservation of a claim she may have
under the parties' lease.
Finally, the court cannot credit petitioner' s boilerplate claims of prej udice. Prejudice in
this context is shown where the nonmovi ng party is "hindered in the preparation of his case or
has been prevented from taking some measure in support of his position." (Loomis v Civetta
Corinno Constr. Corp., 54 NY2d 18, 23, 444 NYS2d 571 [1981 ]; Jacobson v McNeil Consumer

& Specialty Pharmaceuticals, 68 AD3d 652, 654-655, 891 NYS2d 387 [I5l Dept 2009]
(prejudice does not occur simply because a defendant is exposed to greater liability or because a
defendant has to expend additional time preparing its case) [internal citations omitted]).
Petitioner's non-specific allegations of prejudice are unsupported.

9

See Petition "wherefore" clause.
See Paragraph 20 of the lease (exhibit D to opposition).
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Mot ion for Discovery
The availability of discovery in summary holdover proceedings is well established, and
courts have consistently held that discovery is not "inherently hostile" to the nature of a
summary proceeding. (see New York Univ. v Farkas, 121 Misc. 2d 643, 645, 468 NYS 2d 808
[Civ Ct, New York County 1983) quoting 42 West 15th Street Corp. v Friedman, 208 Misc. 123,
125, 143 NYS2d 159 [App Term, J51 Dept 1955]).
Leave to conduct discovery in a summary proceeding may be granted by leave of court
pursuant to CPLR §408 where "ample need" is shown by the party requesting disclosure. (see

New York Univ. v Farkas, 12 I Misc. 2d at 646; Mautner-Glick Corp. v. Higgins, 64 Misc. 3d 16,
18 [App Tenn, 1st Dept 2019)). Courts will consider the following factors in determining
whether the "ample need" standard is met:

"In determining whether ample need has been established, courts consider a
number of factors, not all of which need to be present in every case, including
whether the party seeking discovery has asserted facts to establish a claim or
defense; whether there is a need to determine information directly related to the
claim or defense; whether the requested disclosure is carefully tailored and likely
to clarify the disputed facts; whether prejudice will result from granting leave to
conduct discovery; whether any prejudice caused by granting a discovery request
can be diminished by an order fashioned by the court for that purpose; and
whether the court, in its supervisory role, can structure discovery so that pro se
tenants in pa1ticular will be protected."

(Mautner-Glick Corp. v Higgins, 64 Misc. 3d at 18-19, citing New York Univ. v Farkas, 121
Misc. 2d at 64 7). 11
.

.

Here, there is no dispute that the subject premises were not registered with DHCR from
1984 through 20 11 and that there is no explanation for the failure to register or for how the first
registered rent was calculated. It is also undisputed that the DHCR rent registration attached by
respondent is correct.

12

Furthermore, there is no dispute that the legal rent for the subject premises increased by
over 67% between the 2018 and 20 19 DHCR registrations. 13

11

See 699 Venture Corp. v Zuniga, 64 Misc. 3d 847, 854, 105 NYS3d 806 [Civ Ct, Bronx County 20 19]
("Notwithstanding the factors set forth in Parka.~. the language of the Act in and of itself justifies the discovery
sought by Respondent"). See also Widsam Realty Corp. v Joyner, 66 Misc. 3d I32(AJ, 20 19 NY Slip Op 52097[U]
[App Term, I11 Dept 20 19]).
12
See Par. 52 of opposition.
13
See exhibits F & H to motion and exhibit F to opposition.
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Petitioner alleges that individual apartment improvements ("IAis") justify and explain
this approximately 67% increase, but provides no explanation for the failure to register the
subject premises from 1984 to 2011 , for how the first registered rent was calculated or why the
first registered rent was pursuant to a renewal lease rather than an initial lease. However,
petitioner maintains that respondent cannot challenge the failure to register the rents or seek
discovery going back to 1984 and further alleges that its explanation as to the TAis more than
justify the large increase in rent from 2018 to 2019.
The HSTPA allows the respondent to challenge the first registered rent and determine
whether such rent is reliable, especially given the lack of explanation from petitioner and the fact
that a preferential rent was provided to tenants nearly the entire time the subject premises were
registered, giving tenants no incentive to earlier challenge the purpo1ted "legal" rents.
Additionally, petitioner's own self-serving explanation as to the substantial rent increase from
20 18 and 2019 is certainly not decisive and does not preclude respondent from seeking discovery
to determine whether petitioner 's claims are correct.
Respondent's challenge to the fai lure to register the rents, the reliability of the initial
registered rent and the over 67% rent increase is proper under the HSTPA. The HSTPA, while
limiting rent overcharge damages [including treble damages) to six years, does not have any
temporal limitations when determining the legal regulated rent, in investigating overcharge
complaints, determining the propriety of legal registered renrs during a period when tenants were
charged preferential rents, or in determining the legality of a rent charged or registered
immediately prior to the registration of a preferential rent.
Most importantly, the change to the law imposes no time limit on either how far back
DHCR and courts can look to determine whether an overcharge has occurred or whether the
rents charged or registered are proper and reliable.
Similarly, Part F § 6 of the 20 19 HSTPA amended CPLR § 213-a which originally
imposed a four-year statute of limitations for commencing an overcharge, for awarding damages
on an overcharge, and for examining rental records to determine if an overcharge occurred.
Part F § 6 of the 2019 HSTPA amended CPLR § 213-a to read as fo llows: "No
overcharge penalties or damages may be awarded for a period more than six years before the
action is commenced or complaint is filed, however, an overcharge claim may be filed at any
lime, and the calculation and determination of the legal rent and the amount of the overcharge
Page 7of12

shall be made in accordance with provisions of law governing the determination and calculation
of overcharges." [emphasis added].
Thus, the statute of limitations for commencing an overcharge complaint was eliminated
in its entirety so that an overcharge complaint "may be filed at any time."
Finally, the new CPLR § 2 13-a also eliminated in its entirety the provision prohibiting
courts and DHCR from examining the rental history more than four years prior. In fact, the
amended CPLR § 213-a in conj unction with the amended RSL § 26-516 makes it clear that
courts and DHCR shall "consider all available rent history" necessary to determine the legal rent
and any overcharge that may have occurred.
Here, it is clear that respondent has shown ample need for ce1tain discovery where this
court has already held that respondent's rent related defenses and claims, including the
overcharge and fai lure to register claims, have merit.
Respondent has demonstrated ample need for disclosure going back to 1984 because she
has identified and asserted facts, i.e., an unexplained failure to register, an unreliable initial
registered rent and an unexplained increase in rent resulting in consistently unreliable
registrations, to establish her rent-related claims and defenses, including overcharge and
improper registration. Additional information is necessary and directly related to these claims
and defenses. (see 699 Venture Corp. v Zuniga, 64 Misc. 3d 847, 854-855, 105 NYS3d 806 [Civ
Ct, Bronx County 2019]).
Additionally, there is no dispute that respondent herein was charged a lower preferential
rent from the commencement of her tenancy to date, as were all tenants since 2013, the year after
the subject premises were first registered with DHCR. Whether there has been an overcharge is
uncertain. The lower rents, however, further justify discovery. With the lower rents, respondent
had no incentive to earlier challenge the purported "legal" rents and/or deregulation. (see 560-

568 Audubon Realty Inc. v Rodriguez, 54 Misc. 3d 1226[A], 2017 NY Slip Op 50323[0] [Civ
Ct, New York County 2017]; also see DHCR Fact Sheet #40, revised 1114- in effect prior to the
9/ 19 revision; 656 Realty LLC v Cabrera, 27 Misc. 3d 1225[A], 2009 NY Sl ip Op 52767[U]
[Civ Ct, New York County 2009]).
The fi rst document dem.and, seeking all leases from 1984 to th'e present, including alt of
respondent's lease and all documents executed in connection therewith, is granted in part and
denied in part. Petitioner is directed to produce any leases from 1984 to the present, to the extent
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petitioner has same in its possession, custody or control. If no such documents exist, petitioner is
to provide an affidavit so stating.
However, the demand for production of respondent's lease documents is denied as she
offers no explanation why such documents sought should be discoverable when respondent has,
or should have, copies of all such documents within her possession or control and therefore these
documents are not solely within petitioner's custody, possession and/or control. (see City ofNew
York v 330 Continental LLC, 2019 NY Slip Op 3 1532 [U], 20 10 WL 2572598 [Sup Ct, New
York County 2010], citing Cornex Inc. v Carisbrook!ndus., i nc., 161AD2d376, 555 NYS2d
322 [!51 Dept 1990]; Roger Morris Apt. Corp. v Varela, 51 Misc. 3d 1220[A], *7, 41 NYS3d
452 [Civ Ct, New York County 2016] ("parties do not evince sufficient need in order to obtain
such leave when their adversaries do not have exclusive knowledge of the n~atter at hand or
where the parties seeking discove1y are themselves the ones with the knowledge of the matter")).
Respondent's second demand, seeking all origina l and amended rent registrations from
1984 to the present, along with all documents underlying said registrations, is also granted in part
and denied in part. Petitioner is directed to produce any rent registrations and underlying
documents/or the subject premises only from 1984 to date, to the extent petitioner has same in
its possession, custody or control. If no such documents exist, petitioner is· to provide an affidavit
so stating.
The portion of respondent's demand seeking "all documents underlying these
registrations" is denied. (see 1234 Broadway LLC v Jing Yong Xu, l 0 Misc. 3d 655, 658, 809
NYS2d 825 [Civ Ct, New York County 2005] ("This request does not sufficiently specify the
items sought with reasonable particularity, and as the burden of specificity is on the [party
seeking discovery] said request is stricken.")).
In New York v M. Paul Friedberg & Assoc., the Appellate Division, First Department
unde11ook an extensive analysis of discove~·y principles, and the consequences of failure to seek
discovery which is specific and narrowly tailored:
The principle has general application and requires that a discovery notice properly
designate the documents and records to be produced with required specificity.
T ime and again, when confronted with a discovery notice which failed
specifically to designate the records and documents to be produced, this court has
vacated such notice as palpably improper, relegating the party to the appropriate
deposition procedure in advance of discovery announced in Rios. (Wood v Sardi'.~·
Rest. Corp., 47 AD2d 870, 871.) Very recently in King v Morris (57 AD2d 530)
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this court again observed, also in reliance upon Rios, that "lacking knowledge of
the existence of specific documents, the party seeking discovery and inspection
pursuant to CPLR 3 120, should initially make proper use of the deposition and
related procedures provided for in the CPLR in order to ascertain the existence of
such documents in order that they may be designated with specificity in a CPLR
3 120 notice." No reason appears why we should now erode the Rios doctrine by
sustaining as sufficient a notice to produce which so palpably Jacks any
semblance of reasonable specificity or particularity.
62 A02d 407, 409-4 10, 404 NYS2d 868' [1st Dept 1978)).
This portion of respondent's second demand is vague and overbroad and is not narrowly
tailored. Respondent's vague discovery demand gives no indication of what documents she
actually seeks, and it is clear that respondent cannot identify such items with pa11icularity or
whether such documents exist.
Respondent's third discovery demand, seeking production of rent records showing the
rents charged or paid for the subject premises from 1984 to the present, essentially a rent history
for the subject premises, is granted to the extent petitioner has same in its possession, custody or
control. If no such documents exist, petitioner is to provide an affidavit so stating.
Respondent's fourth discovery demand, seeking all documents concerning rent increases
for the subject premises from 20 18 to the present, including IAis and other increases, is granted
to the extent petitioner has same in its possession, custody or control. If no such documents exist,
petitioner is to provide an affidavit so stating.

14

Respondent' s last discovery demand, seeking "any and all documents concerning the
length(s) of any tenancy in effect from 1984 to present" is denied as vague, overbroad, not
narrowly tailored and Jacking any particularity. As such, this demand is patently improper. (see

New Yorkv M Paul Friedberg & Assoc., 62 AD2d at 409-4 10;; Kantor v Kaye, 114 AD2d 782,
782, 495 NYS2d 42 [1st Dept 1985); WM Wellington, LLC v Grafslein Diamond, Inc., 22
Misc.3d 11 23[A], *7-8, 880 NYS2d 228 [Civ Ct, New York County 2009) ("a demand for the
production of documents must specify the items sought with ' reasonable particularity,' and the
burden of specificity is on the requesting party ... the utilization of the language 'any and all,'
which is the case here, is an indication of a lack of the requisite specificity. To the extent that the

14
The court notes that petitioner has already provided a several documents in support of its claim to IA ls for the
subject premises. Sec Exhibit E to opposition. If additional documents exist, petitioner is directed to produce same.
Petitioner need not reproduce documents already subin itted in its opposition and, if no additional documents exist,
petitioner is to provide an affidavit so stating.
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respondents lack knowledge of the existence of specific document(s), then they should make use
of a deposition and/or related procedures as provided for in the CPLR so as to ascertain the
existence of such documents in order that they may be designated with specificity in a notice to
produce.") [internal citations omitted]).
Finally, while respondent has shown ample need for certain dis.covery, as limited above,
petitioner fails to show prejudice. Petitioner's claim that it would suffer prejudice because
respondent is seeking evidence going back beyond 20 J 3 where petitioner was not required to
keep records going back beyond four years prior to the HSTPA is unpersuasive. 15
It is important to point out that such claims of prejudice are made by petitioner's attorney

with no personal knowledge of the facts. However, an "affirmation by the plaintiffs' attorney,
who clearly has no such knowledge," is insufficient and cannot be given any weight. (Arriaga v
Michael Laub Co., 233 AD2d 244, 649 NYS2d 707 [l st Dept 1996]; see Jandoli v Lange, 35

AD2d 793, 794, 315 NYS2d 752 [l51 Dept 1970]). Petitioner's agent's affidavit claims no
prejudice; it merely states that petitioner bought the building in 20 16 and therefore would have
no knowledge of why the subject premises were not registered.
Therefore, respondent is entitled to discovery going back to 1984. This is especially true
in light of the subsequent Appellate Division decision in Zit man v Sut!on LLC, (177 AD3d 565,
566, 20 19 NY Slip Op 08527 [ l5 1 Dept 2019]) allowing a respondent to maintain an overcharge
complaint stemming from a rent increase in 1986. (see also Widsam Realty Corp v Joyner, 65
Misc. 3d l 32(A], 20 19 NY Slip Op 52097[U] [App Term,

1st

Dept 20 19] [affirming look back to

1989]).
If petitioner finds this harsh and unreasonable, and this is an " undesirable result, the
problem is one to be addressed by the Legislature." (Chazon, LLC v. Maugenest, 19 NY3d 410,
415, 948 NYS2d 571 [2012]; see Harris v. Israel, 65 Misc. 3d 155(A), *2, 2019 NY Slip Op
51925(U] (App Tenn, pt Dept 2019]).

" In the simplest terms, respondent is entitled to discovery as petitioner did not register the subject apartment for
almost three decades ( 1984-2012), and petitioner provides no explanation how the first rent was set (or why it would
have been pursuant to a lease renewal). In this court's view, respondent is enti tled to discovery under "old" law or
new.
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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, it is So Ordered, that respondent's motion for leave to serve and
file an amended answer is granted. The attached amended answer is deemed served and filed.
Respondent's application for discovery is granted to the extent discussed herein and as limited by
this Order and is denied in all other respects; petitioner is directed to comply with this Order and
respond to respondent's discovery demands within 30 days of service of this Order upon
petitioner with notice of entry. This matter is adjourned to April l 4, 2020, 9:30 A.M, Part F,
Room 320, for the court to monitor compliance.

Dated: February 18, 2020
Bronx, New York

To:
Hering Welikson Rosen & Digrugilliers, PC
Attorneys for Petitioner
11 Hillside A venue
Williston Park, NY 11596
&
Bronx Legal Services
Attorneys for Respondent
349 East l 49 1hStreet, 1o•h Floor
Bronx, NY 10451
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